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Introduction
In late December 2005, the reconstituted Labour-led
government announced that a carbon charge would not
be introduced in 2007. Indeed, it now appears that there
will be no broad-based economic instrument to mitigate
climate change before 2012. This story made the world’s
climate change press. A carbon charge has been on New
Zealand’s policy agenda since the mid-1990s, and until
very recently had been supported by both centre-right
and centre-left governments. It was the centrepiece of
the climate change policy announced by the Labour-
led government in 2002 when it ratified the Kyoto
Protocol. So why the abrupt change of policy?
It is likely that politics played a key role. The government
had not enacted legislation in its previous term to give
effect to the planned carbon tax. As a result of the general
election in September 2005, it was questionable whether
the new minority government could muster the numbers
to pass such a bill. During the election campaign four
parties, including two that would become support
partners for Labour in October 2005, spoke out strongly
against the carbon tax – and Kyoto. Moreover, the
‘carbon tax’ had become demonised over recent years
by a range of business groups.
This brief article does not delve into the politics of this
situation. Rather, it looks at the role in the decision to
abandon the carbon tax of an interdepartmental Policy
Review commenced in mid-2005, and delivered to the
new Cabinet in early December. The Review was started
because of a realisation that New Zealand is no longer
on track to be a net seller in the Kyoto market. For
years it had been thought, based on projections, that
New Zealand’s considerable growth in emissions (along
with growth in its economy) would still be more than
offset by the sink credits generated from its afforestation
efforts in the 1990s. The news had changed in early
2005 when officials did their annual inventory and
projection sums based on the actual planting rates and
using the recently agreed new international rules for
accounting. Now there is a projected deficit, not surplus.
The Policy Review and officials’ advice to
the Cabinet
An assessment of the Cabinet paper presented to the new
government on the outcomes of the Policy Review reveals
key policy issues and raises many questions.1  The advice
represents, to a significant degree, a full rebuttal of the
use of economic instruments that were the core of the
2002 policy package to address climate change issues.
This has been surprising to many observers, as they had
expected an outcome of the Review to be a ramping up
of policy efforts, not a wholesale deconstruction.
Key features of the advice and recommendations include:
• With respect to the carbon charge – referred to as
the ‘carbon tax model’, which incorporates the
negotiated greenhouse agreements (NGAs) element
– the Cabinet paper asked the Cabinet to agree that
the carbon tax would not start at the previously
announced date of 1 April 2007, and also to agree
on one of four options. Three of these entailed, to
varying degrees, not introducing a carbon tax or any
other broad-based greenhouse gas tax; the fourth was
to defer a decision until early March 2006 following
further consideration of the outcomes of the Review.
• In keeping with these agree recommendations, the
Cabinet was asked to note the Review Report’s
conclusion that emission reductions cannot be achieved
at the lowest cost if NGAs and the exemption for
livestock methane and nitrous oxide from a greenhouse
gas tax were extended well beyond 2012, and that the
carbon tax and associated NGAs are unlikely to be
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1 The report of the Policy Review and the Cabinet paper and associated
Cabinet minute can be found on the New Zealand government’s
climate change website at http://www.climaechange.govt.nz/.
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sustainable over the medium term and would need to
be replaced by some other policy package.
• On agricultural emissions (methane and nitrous
oxide from livestock), the paper asked the Cabinet
to confirm that these emissions would remain exempt
from any broad based greenhouse gas tax until 2012.
• On the Projects to Reduce Emissions (PRE)
programme, the Cabinet was asked to agree that the
third round would not proceed.
• On emissions trading, the Cabinet was to note that
one of the key findings of the Policy Review was that
the government should not develop a New Zealand
emissions trading scheme to apply in the period 2008–
2012, but should consider it for post-2012.
Of the agree options provided on the carbon tax, the
Cabinet decided not to introduce the carbon tax model or
any other broad-based greenhouse gas tax before the end
of the Kyoto Protocol first commitment period (KP CP1)
– while noting that this did not preclude a more narrowly-
based tax on large emitters if this was deemed appropriate.
Against this, with regard to the PRE programme, the
Cabinet rejected the advice received and agreed that the
third round would proceed. In keeping with this, it directed
officials in their March 2006 report back to provide advice
on how to achieve greater assurance that the emission
reductions resulting from projects will be greater than the
emission units given away to project owners.
What was the thinking that underlay this sweeping rejection
of the 2002 policy package on climate change? A perhaps
cynical and boiled-down judgement of the Policy Review
and the related Cabinet paper might be that it ended up in
something of a ‘policy no man’s land’. The Review seems
to seek efficiency through broadly applied price-based
measures. Exemptions from these ‘sticks’ are seen as
distortionary and inefficient. But then there are
competitiveness issues, and the practicalities of applying
stick measures to the agriculture sector. Linking to the
international carbon price seems scary. Other possible
economic instrument tools (like projects schemes) are really
just subsidies, so they are bad. Smart revenue recycling?
Not even contemplated. And emissions trading is just all
too complex. So what is the answer? Give up on economic
instruments and just have the taxpayer buy New Zealand’s
way out of KP CP1. And adjust the environmental goals
so this doesn’t look too bad. Oh, and better not think too
hard about CP2 … for now at least.
This may be overly harsh. But where has the Policy
Review got to, or pointed to, that is significantly
different than this? One matter is clear: the Review will
not have added any certainty in this important area. Yet
policy certainty is a key objective of business, and a
valuable commodity in other respects.
The 2002 policy environment and policy
package
A more analytical and objective assessment of the Policy
Review reveals some key points. The first is how little
the 2002 policy and its underlying objectives seem to
be now remembered and understood. The overarching
policy environment in 2002:
• took the economic and social risks of climate change
to New Zealand and the immediate Pacific region
seriously, and set domestic policy within a risk
management strategy that involved New Zealand
actively seeking greater engagement of the world’s
large emitters. This strategy recognised the
importance of this country maintaining credibility
in order to be effective in this effort;
• cared about the efficiency of New Zealand’s response
and worried about costs imposed on the economy
and taxpayers as a result of inefficient investments
with long-term emissions consequences;
• assumed that it was more likely than not that
quantitative constraints on countries’ greenhouse
emissions would become more stringent in the
future; and
• considered that New Zealand’s international
credibility would be seriously affected if it withdrew
from international action to address the risks of
climate change, and that this effect on international
credibility could have severe economic and political
implications across New Zealand’s wide range of
engagements with the outside world.
Put simply, the prime objective of using economic
instruments and putting them at the core of the 2002
policy was to place an opportunity cost linked to the
international price of carbon on all emissions in the energy
sector. This was to be done through an innovative mix of
policy tools. The use of economic instruments to help
manage CO
2
 emissions reflected the desire of the
government to tilt the economic playing field towards
climate-friendly actions, both on the supply side (e.g. new
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investments in electricity generation more likely to be
renewables or higher efficiency/less carbon-intensive
thermal) and the demand side (e.g. improved economics
of energy efficiency and fuel switching measures).
A policy tool, or package of tools, was needed to do
this. The 2002 package, arrived at after many years of
analysis and rounds of stakeholder consideration,2  chose
a carbon charge at the estimated international price as
the core economic policy tool. This charge was primarily
on CO
2
 emissions in the energy sector. All revenue from
climate change policies was to be redistributed back into
the economy, e.g. through the tax system and climate
change projects/programmes.
Recognising the potential ‘lose-lose’ situation3  that
may be faced by many of New Zealand’s leading
industries that face significant international
competitiveness risks, the policy included a negotiated
greenhouse agreements exemption programme. A set
of Kyoto-like flexibilities were included to ensure
these firms would also face the opportunity cost of
the international carbon price.
Agricultural sector non-CO
2
 emissions and some other
non-CO
2
 emissions were not covered by the charge.
Instead, government sought a funding partnership for
research to find opportunities to reduce emissions. This
recognised the different nature and number of
opportunities and decision makers in these sectors.
To address the potential of inefficiencies in sectors not
covered by the charge, and even those covered by the
charge where market failures may exist, a projects-based
scheme was proposed that would see emitters faced with
the opportunity cost of the international carbon price.
But this could be done without imposing a cost.
The final part of the package was that it could be converted
to more of an emissions trading model relatively seamlessly
if the international conditions became appropriate. In
2002 it was uncertain if or when this might be the case.
(By 2005 it had become clear that most countries with
Kyoto targets see emissions trading as their core market-
based policy tool, not a carbon charge.)
New thinking
The hinge pin of the Review’s new tack might be seen
in a discussion on whether it is important for New
Zealand to be linked to the international price of
carbon. This issue is taken up in the Review following
a section discussing possible alternative policy options.
After making the point that the 2002 policy is based
on a central principle that the carbon price should
reflect the international price, it goes on to say:
Most of the options discussed earlier in this
section involve a decoupling of the domestic
price from the international price in the short
term (to 2012), and some options would
continue this into the medium term and perhaps
longer. Does this matter?
In short, this section concedes that in the event that
New Zealand faces a quantitative commitment, as in
Kyoto’s CP1, the taxpayer will bear the cost of any
additional emissions that may occur because the
international price is not reflected: ‘Taxpayers would
pay more and emitters would pay less.’ But it says this
fiscal outcome needs to be ‘weighed against any adverse
effects from a reduction in international competitiveness
and, ultimately, in economic growth’.
However, this ‘weighing up’ is not then done in any
analytical fashion. Nor is there any real analysis behind
the circular argument:
As long as New Zealand’s commitment to
fulfilling its obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol was credible, it is unlikely that the
country’s international credibility would suffer
if the domestic price of carbon were below the
international price.
And it goes on:
Beyond CP1, if New Zealand had specific
quantitative commitments, the issues would be
the same. However, if New Zealand did not have
such commitments, and did not intend to have
such commitments in the foreseeable future,
there would be no benefit from having the
domestic price reflecting the international price.
This seems to suggest that New Zealand may opt out
of taking on future commitments in the international
regime that will come after 2012. In turn this indicates
that some in government have not bought into the
2 In contrast, many groups complained about the Policy Review’s
‘closed shop’, non-transparent process.
3 Emissions displaced outside the Kyoto cap that covers New
Zealand’s means an absolute increase of emission to the
atmosphere. The second ‘lose’ is the reduction of economic activity
in New Zealand.
V
ol
um
e 
2,
 N
um
be
r 
1 
20
06
24
seriousness of climate change or the risk management
strategy that underpinned the 2002 policy package.
The way forward
Officials have now been directed to report back to
ministers in March 2006. Part of this will be on a work
programme to develop a replacement set of policies. Also
on the table is a restatement of the overarching
objective(s) for climate change policy because it is now
seen as ‘unrealistic for New Zealand to achieve its
internal target, namely gross emissions being set towards
a permanent downward path by 2012’. One implication
of this is that New Zealand might set a less challenging
target at the very time the evidence is pointing to the
need for urgent global action – and this is now being
taken up daily in the world’s media. What would this
do to New Zealand’s international credibility?
Given the significance of the issues at stake, what is needed
is a robust and inclusive process that engages the country’s
best minds, from both within and outside government,
with the objective of developing a coherent and durable
climate change policy. Before officials and interested
stakeholders begin to delve down into the details of
possibly over-narrow tracks, this process should first step
back and tackle the following set of high-level issues:
Risk management
Internationally, governmental initiatives to mitigate
climate change are seen as increasingly urgent. Much more
action needs to be taken globally in the next 10–20 years
to help prevent the crossing of ‘tipping points’4  that would
lead to consequences described by many leading scientists
and world thinkers as ‘catastrophic’. What is New
Zealand’s strategic approach to managing such risks? How
important is the credibility of our domestic action?
Economic efficiency
Unless New Zealand is contemplating backing away
from any future international climate regime that
generates an international carbon price, the principle
that the international price of carbon should somehow
guide efficient decision making in New Zealand must
still hold. Or are we prepared to have the taxpayer foot
the extra bill caused by inefficient decisions (for the
lifetime of their effects) by just buying in overseas units?
Economic instruments are widely regarded as being the
means to get the carbon price signal to the correct point
of decision making. Private agents (firms and
individuals) know much better than government what
their opportunities are to take cost-effective actions. But
price-based (stick) policy tools should not be the only
ones in the economic instrument toolkit that New
Zealand will consider. For some sectors and actors in
the economy, it needs to look also to other tools that
can provide incentives at the international cost of carbon
without imposing a cost of emissions. But how far is
the use of ‘carrots’ acceptable?
Implementing and sustaining policy
In a policy area with the potential economic and social
impacts of climate change, business and public support
is critical for policy to be implemented and sustainable
over time. This does not mean that policy cannot also
be flexible and evolve over time as circumstances change
(e.g. uncertainties become resolved). Two key issues are
evident here:
• Do we expect that legitimate concerns about
international competitiveness will continue for many
of our major industries, and that domestic climate
change policies should take heed of these concerns
while they exist? In short, are (reviewable) exemption
policies acceptable?
• Can revenue recycling be considered outside the trap
of tax policy orthodoxy, so that price-based economic
instruments can be used and garner popular support?
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4 Google ‘tipping points and climate change’ to get a good sense of
the recent evidence on and media attention to this.
